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teven, a minor living with his mother, enjoyed a nurturing
relationship with his father, Mark. He saw his father every
weekend and looked forward to their time together. Mark
looked for ways in which to stay involved in his child’s life.
Two days ago, the Department of Human Services (DHS) re-
moved Steven from his mother’s custody because, unbeknown to
Mark, Steven’s mother was selling drugs in the home. At the time of
removal, the police did not inquire about the whereabouts of
Steven’s father; DHS immediately placed Steven in a foster home.
The next day, a preliminary hearing was held before a judge in
the family division of the circuit court. Steven’s mother, recognizing
the overwhelming evidence against her, entered a no contest plea to
the allegations. The court accepted the plea, assumed temporary
custody of the child, and scheduled a dispositional hearing.
‘‘Not so fast,’’ shouted Mark, who appeared at the hearing, de-
spite never having received formal notice of the proceeding. Mark
demanded that Steven be placed in his custody immediately and
objected to the court assuming any power over him or his child.
The law presumed him to be a fit parent, he stated, and the state’s
petition contained no allegations to the contrary. Yet the court in-
formed Mark that, under Michigan law, a court can obtain tempo-
rary custody or jurisdiction over a child once one parent is found to
have neglected the child, even if the other parent did nothing
wrong. The court further stated that at the dispositional stage, it
would determine whether placement with Mark was in the child’s
best interest. The court ordered that DHS conduct criminal back-
ground and child protection checks of Mark, as well as a home
study. Until the disposition, Steven was to remain in foster care,
and his father was given weekly, supervised visits.
At the dispositional hearing, DHS reported that Mark had sev-
eral drug-related arrests in the past and a shaky employment his-
tory. On the basis of these concerns and the DHS recommenda-
tion, the court ordered Mark to submit to random drug screens and
obtain suitable employment before any consideration of placing
Steven with him. Mark pleaded with the court, wondering, ‘‘How
can the court have so much power over me and my child if I didn’t
do anything wrong?’’
Unfortunately for Mark, the court was correct in its interpreta-
tion of Michigan law on this issue. In In re CR, the court of appeals
held that a court can assume temporary custody of a child and
enter dispositional orders affecting the child and both parents solely
on the basis of a finding that one parent neglected the child.1 The
court stated, ‘‘[T]he court rules simply do not place a burden on a
petitioner like the FIA2 to file a petition and sustain the burden of
proof at an adjudication with respect to every parent of the child in-
volved in a protective proceeding before the family court can act in
its dispositional capacity.’’3 One parent’s plea eliminates ‘‘the FIA’s
obligation to allege and demonstrate by a preponderance of legally
admissible evidence that [the other parent] was abusive or neglect-
ful . . . before the family court could enter a dispositional order that
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G would control or affect his conduct.’’4 In a series of unpublished
opinions after In re CR, the court of appeals repeatedly has affirmed
this holding.5
These holdings are consistent with the longstanding view in
Michigan child protective proceedings that the court acquires a form
of in rem jurisdiction over the child once there is any evidence that
the child was abused or neglected by either parent.6 Such a finding
empowers the court, as parens patriae, to issue any order it considers
necessary, even if it infringes on a non-offending parent’s rights.
The scope of the power the court obtains after it assumes jurisdic-
tion over a child is extensive. At the dispositional stage in a neglect
proceeding, the court becomes the surrogate parent for a child and
obtains authority to make decisions typically held by parents.
For example, the court can place the child where it deems best,
determine the appropriateness of medical treatment, and decide
who may visit the child.7 In addition, the court can decide whether
to accept a case plan submitted by the DHS, which may require
each parent to comply with services such as parenting classes, indi-
vidual counseling, random drug testing, and psychological evalua-
tions.8 These orders are not limited to the abusive parent. The
statute makes clear that the court can issue orders ‘‘affecting adults
as in the opinion of the court are necessary for the physical, mental
or moral well-being of a particular juvenile,’’9 which has been inter-
preted to include the non-abusive parent.10
The practice of assuming jurisdiction over a child solely on the
basis of the wrongdoing of one parent raises serious constitutional
concerns. The liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by the United States Supreme Court.11
The Court’s decisions ‘‘ ‘establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family
is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ’’12 The in-
tegrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment.13
The law presumes parents to be fit,14 and anyone, including the
state, seeking to separate a child from his or her parent must pre-
sent evidence of parental unfitness at a court hearing before re-
moving the child absent exigent circumstances.15 Without such evi-
dence, the state is forbidden from removing a child from such a
home, and the fit parent is entitled to custody of the child.16 Even
when there is evidence that one parent has abused the child, the
non-offending parent still maintains familial rights, even if he or
she has not been a model parent.17 Simply put, without evidence of
parental unfitness, children must remain with their families.
The United States Supreme Court, in Stanley v Illinois, rejected
the use of blanket presumptions of unfitness in child welfare pro-
ceedings. In Stanley, the Court addressed the issue of presumptively
denying unmarried fathers custody of their children without a judi-
cial finding of parental unfitness.18 Under Illinois law, the children
of unwed fathers automatically became wards of the state upon the
death of their mother. The state argued that proof that an unmar-
ried mother of a child was dead was enough to separate the father
from his child and that the father could seek to prove his fitness by
initiating guardianship or adoption proceedings.19
The Court rejected the argument and held that the Constitution
requires, as a matter of due process, that the father have a ‘‘hearing
on his f itness as a parent before his children were taken from
him . . . .’’20 The state’s interest in presuming the unfitness of all un-
married fathers and efficiently disposing of their rights did not out-
weigh the constitutional interests of the father. The Court stated:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individual-
ized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the deter-
minative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains pres-
ent realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running
roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child. It there-
fore cannot stand.21
The Court was clear that categorical presumptions of fitness are
forbidden by the Constitution.
The current practice of depriving non-offending parents custody
of a child without a judicial determination of unfitness raises con-
cerns similar to those articulated in Stanley. Unlike the situation in
Stanley, in which the state specifically argued that the father was
unfit because he was not married to the child’s mother, Michigan
law permits courts simply to ignore the fitness of the non-offending
parent and proceed to disposition. At disposition, the burden shifts
to the non-offending parent to demonstrate parental fitness through
various tests established by the state, ranging from a home study
to parenting classes to random drug screening. A failure to jump
through any one of a number of hoops could result in indefinite
separation between the parent and child. Unless the state seeks to
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terminate that parent’s rights, it is never forced to prove, with legally
admissible evidence, that the parent is not fit. The court becomes
the child’s surrogate parent despite the presence of a biological par-
ent who is presumed to be fit under the Constitution.
To accord with the constitutional principles articulated by the
United States Supreme Court, current practice must be reformed.
One possibility is that, once a non-offending parent steps forward
and seeks custody of his child, the court should ask the state what
evidence it has to prove that the parent is unfit and whether it
plans to amend its petition to include allegations against that par-
ent. The court should give the state a very short period of time to
investigate and, at that point, the state must either amend its peti-
tion to include the parent or release the child into the custody of
the non-offending parent.
If the state amends its petition and seeks to keep the child in fos-
ter care, an immediate hearing must be held in which the state
must demonstrate that placement in the non-offending parent’s
custody would be contrary to the welfare of the child.22 If no such
evidence exists, the child must be returned to the non-offending
parent. In either case, a trial must be held on the allegations against
both parents; the court cannot obtain temporary custody over the
child until that occurs.
The proposed approach balances the parent’s right to custody
with the state’s interest in safeguarding the minor. Parents are guar-
anteed a speedy decision about whether a child neglect case is going
to be brought against them and, if not, are entitled to custody of
their child. The state, which likely removed the child during exigent
circumstances, is given a short period of time to conduct any addi-
tional investigation to ensure that the recently surfaced parent, about
whom the state likely possesses very little information, will not
harm the child.
A few jurisdictions have endorsed this approach. In California, if
a non-custodial, non-offending parent exists, ‘‘the court is required
to place the child with that parent unless it finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence that placement with that parent would be detri-
mental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being
of the child.’’23 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a
child cannot be considered neglected if she has a non-custodial par-
ent who is ready, willing, and able to provide her with adequate
care.24 Similarly, in Maryland, ‘‘[a] child who has at least one parent
willing and able to provide the child with proper care and attention
should not be taken from both parents and be made a ward of the
court.’’25 These decisions support the concept articulated above:
that a child should be placed with the non-offending parent if the
state fails to bring forth evidence of parental unfitness.
Conclusion
Caseworkers at child welfare agencies face difficult decisions
every day. They enter homes at late hours and take actions, often
with little information, that will affect the rest of a child’s life. Work-
ers do not have the luxury of taking time to assess a situation, and
the snapshot judgments they form lay the foundation for what they
do. The difficulty of this process is not to be minimized.
Yet one of the flaws in the child welfare system is the system’s re-
luctance to allow children in its grasp to return to the care of par-
ents, particularly those who did nothing wrong. By adopting a
bright-line test in which courts must return children to the care of a
parent if the state fails to bring forth allegations of unfitness against
that parent, the autonomy of the family, a fundamental principle
cherished by the drafters of the Constitution, can be restored. ♦
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